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Abstract
‘Fragmentation’, ‘pluralism’, ‘constitutionalisation’ and
‘global administrative law’ are among the most dominant
narratives of international legal order at present. Each narra-
tive makes a descriptive claim about the current state of the
international legal order, and outlines a normative vision for
this order. Yet we must not lose sight of the conflicts
between, and the contingency of these, and other narra-
tives. This article seeks to recover both conflicts and contin-
gency by showing how each may be used to explain a given
event: the inauguration of a bilateral civil nuclear coopera-
tion between the United State and India, better known as
the ‘India-US nuclear deal’. I explain how the four narratives
may be, and were, co-opted at different times to justify or
critique the ‘deal’. This exercise serve two purposes: the
application of four narratives reveal the various facets of the
deal, and by its example the deal illuminates the stakes
attached to each of the four narratives. In a final section, I
reflect on why these four narratives enjoy their influential
status in international legal scholarship.
Keywords: India-US Nuclear Deal, Nuclear Energy Coopera-
tion, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Fragmentation, Constitution-
alisation, Pluralism, Global Administrative Law
1 The Stakes in Choosing
Narratives
“To give a thing a name, a label, a handle…to pluck
it out of the Place of Namelessness, in short to identi-
fy it -- well, that’s a way of bringing the said thing
into being.”
Salman Rushdie, Haroun and the Sea of Stories (1993)
Writing about New York University’s Global Adminis-
trative Law Project, Susan Marks observed that ‘[t]here
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is something about the act of naming that seems to work
a kind of magic’.1 In naming Global Administrative Law
(GAL), the convenors of the Project
have invited us to think about how seemingly dispa-
rate issues, structures and processes may be connec-
ted – how they might currently be established, but
also how more integrated global systems might be
established in the future. With ‘global administrative
law’ comes an agenda for conceptual reflection,
empirical study and institutional redesign that gives
shape and focus to an immense range of large and
small questions about the control of legal decision
making in the contemporary world.2
Marks’s point that in naming GAL, the convenors of
the GAL project have offered an organising vision to
describe, aggregate, clarify and order the multi-farious
processes of decision-making that we understand as
‘global governance’, and thus have opened a new pro-
grammatic terrain of evaluating, critiquing and reform-
ing these processes, is true also of other such narratives
of international legal order. And there are several. In
addition to GAL, this special issue inquires into inter-
national law’s ‘fragmentation’, ‘constitutionalisation’
and ‘global legal pluralism’. These terms too name phe-
nomena; they too, in doing so, provide aggregative
descriptions and furnish criteria for critique.
Moreover, these narratives are simultaneous. Each is
describing the proverbial elephant, calling attention to
trunk, or tusk, or hide or ear.3 The creatures imagined
on these bases do not necessarily exclude each other:
sometimes two or more of the narratives are brought
together to yield yet more fabulous creatures, such as
‘constitutional pluralism’.
All, of course, assume that there is a beast to be descri-
bed at all. This, Marks pointed out, is part of the ‘magic
of naming’: it makes us lose sight of the assumption and
take for granted that there is a grand narrative to be
1. S. Marks, ‘Naming Global Administrative Law’, 37 NYU Journal of
International Law and Politics, at 995 (2005).
2. Ibid.
3. Those unacquainted with the tale of the wise men and the elephant
may wish to read John Godfrey Saxe’s ‘The Blind Men and the Ele-
phant’, in The Poems of John Godfrey Saxe, Complete in One Volume
(1868), at 259. Appropriately, this poem represents only one of the
many folk narratives about these men, the elephant, and the moral of
the tale.
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offered about the international order and that it can take
the form chosen:
Precisely a new noun phrase like global administra-
tive law seems to create a thing. It seems to bring an
object into being, with a solidity and even a monu-
mentality that risk putting in the shade disputes over
process, agency, and orientation. These reifying
effects are not inevitable, but it does take conscious
effort to keep conflict and contingency in view.4
The reifying effects may be felt at two levels: in choos-
ing one narrative as the narrative of international legal
order, and those that follow from that narrative’s specif-
ic preoccupations and elisions. For example, let me note
here those preoccupations and elisions that Marks has
highlighted for GAL: its procedural focus, which
obscures questions of distributive justice; amenability to
uncritical linear narratives of progress; and the sugges-
tion that it is best, for the time being, to bracket ques-
tions of democracy and focus on administrative-type
reforms.5 Similarly do other narratives produce reifica-
tions and foreclosures.
This article seeks to recover the potential conflicts
between, and contingency of, these narratives, by show-
ing how each may be used to describe a given event, and
examining the aspects that each foregrounds, ignores or
assumes. The event that I examine is the announcement
and operationalisation of a bilateral civil nuclear cooper-
ation agreement between the United States of America
and India, or as it is more popularly known, the India-
USA Nuclear Deal. I will begin by deconstructing it as
an example of fragmentation and then turn to pluralism,
constitutionalisation and global administrative law – in
that order – as three counter-narratives of the Deal. I
hope this exercise will serve two purposes: the applica-
tion of four narratives will reveal the various facets of
the Deal, and the Deal will illuminate the stakes attach-
ed to each of the four narratives. Following this, I will
discuss why, despite their contingencies and limitations,
these narratives are widely successful (re)descriptions of
the international legal order.
2. Narrating the India-US
Nuclear Deal
2.1. A Preliminary
A central feature of this article is its several accounts of
the India–USA Nuclear Deal. This will interest those
who engage with issues of nuclear non-proliferation and
energy cooperation, but others may find the inevitable
repetitions more tedious reading. So let me earn some
early interest by recalling a classic film that followed a
similar approach – Akira Kurosawa’s Rashomon.
4. Marks, supra n. 1, at 996 (2005).
5. Ibid., 996-1001.
In Rashomon, Kurosawa demonstrated the unreliability
of narratives by recounting the same event through four
different viewpoints. The event in focus was the death
of a Japanese samurai preceded by a sexual act between
his wife and a bandit; each viewpoint told a slightly dif-
ferent story of how this came to pass. The viewpoints
were those of these three characters and a ‘neutral’ hid-
den observer. The differences between the narratives
included those of perception: of the duel between the
bandit and the samurai as fierce or pitiful, of the wife as
unwilling or eventually seduced into the sexual act, etc.
There were also differences on the facts: in one narra-
tive the wife begged the bandit to kill the samurai, in
another the samurai to kill the bandit; in one she was
witness to the duel, in another she fainted, in a third she
ran away before it took place; in one narrative there was
no duel at all. Only a few facts were uncontested: the
principal characters were indeed a samurai, his wife and
a bandit; there was a sexual act between the woman and
the bandit; the samurai did die. For the rest, the con-
flicts between the narratives precluded the possibility of
arriving at the ‘truth’ of what happened. The same is
true of many events – a few things may be established,
but most is inference and representation.
Indeed, the very describing of a few assorted facts as an
‘event’ worth studying is a creative act. As Koskenniemi
notes, “a situation or a case is never an ‘event’ or ‘part of
a pattern’ in itself but always appears as one or the other
as a result of language and argument”, and such argu-
ment is always made for a particular purpose.6
I should, then, clarify my purpose in selecting the
India-US nuclear deal as the event to examine here. One
of the options, at the start of writing this article was to
select an already well-discussed event, perhaps one that
had been a visible component of one or more of the four
narratives under discussion here. The Mox Plant litiga-
tion, one of the most-cited illustrations of international
law’s fragmentation,7 but also making a guest appear-
ance in discussions on constitutionalisation,8 may have
served. However, this would have only further rein-
forced the criticality of this particular ‘event’, rather
than showing how almost any set of facts can be trans-
mogrified into supporting a narrative of international
legal order.
Of course, I did not select the India-USA Nuclear Deal
merely out of the desire to make the insignificant inter-
esting. Nuclear governance is a very important issue in
our times, and the Deal offers excellent insight into the
contradictions between its core concepts: non-prolifera-
tion, disarmament and energy cooperation. Moreover
the Deal sits oddly with India’s history of opposition to
6. M. Koskenniemi, ‘Foreword’ in Fleur Johns et al., Events: The Force of
International Law (2011), at xix. See also J. Hohmann, ‘Book Review of
Events: The Force of International Law’, 82 British Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law (2011).
7. See ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study
Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN. 4/L.682, 13 April 
2006.
8. E.U. Petersmann, ‘Human Rights’, International Economic Law and
Constitutional Justice’, 19 EJIL 4, at 769 (2008).
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the nuclear governance regime as a whole and, unsur-
prisingly, this feature has been invoked to different ends
by Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, three of the other
so-called outliers of this regime. These contradictions,
and institutional efforts to reconcile them during the
conclusion and operationalisation of the Deal, offer basis
for each of the four narratives of legal order.
A final preliminary point then, on storyboarding: even
Kurosawa’s highly skilled filmmaking could not stave
off complaints that the film was repetitive and glacially
paced, extending to feature length material only suffi-
cient for a short.9 These are the minimal criticisms that
may be applied to what follows. There will be some rep-
etition, the same events will be refracted in different
ways, with some new material added each time. To
maintain comprehensibility, therefore, I begin with a
linear ‘short’ – setting out some facts about the nuclear
governance regime and the flutter created by the Deal.10
To clarify, the following sub-section is not intended to
provide the authentic account of the Deal, as the stan-
dard against which all narratives are to be evaluated.
Such an enterprise could only undercut the argument
that follows in the rest of this article. The subsection
merely offers an introduction to the Deal for those
entirely unacquainted with it, acknowledging that this
too may be vulnerable to charges of selectivity and sub-
jectiveness.
2.2. An Overview
The India-US Nuclear Deal was first announced in July
2005, in a joint statement issued by Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and President George Bush.11 The
full statement outlined plans for bilateral engagement on
several issues such as the economy, energy and environ-
ment, democracy, development, non-proliferation, high
technology, space exploration. Global attention however
focused on the following sentences:
The President told the Prime Minister that he will
work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation
with India as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear
power and achieving energy security. The President
would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust
US laws and policies, and the United States will work
with friends and allies to adjust international regimes
to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and
trade with India, including but not limited to expedi-
tious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded
nuclear reactors at Tarapur.
The Statement represented a remarkable change in atti-
tude towards India’s nuclear programme. A series of
actions including a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ in 1974,
9. See G. Smith, ‘Critical Reception of Rashomon in the West’, 13 Asian
Cinema 2, at 115 (2002).
10. For a more detailed account, see S. Ranganathan, ‘Visions of Interna-
tional Law: Lessons from the 123 Agreement’, Symposium on India, the
123 Agreement, and Nuclear Energy: Issues of International Law, 51
Indian Journal of International Law 2, at 146 (2011).
11. India-USA Joint Statement (July 18, 2005). <www.dae.gov.in/
jtstmt.htm>.
refusal to ratify the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT)12 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT),13 nuclear tests in 1998, and accelerating pro-
duction of nuclear warheads and missiles, had led to
India’s near-total exclusion from international civil
nuclear trade. And though there were occasional sugges-
tions of the need to ‘engage India’ on nuclear matters,
the proposals advanced to this end usually envisaged
fairly limited forms of assistance to India in return for
its undertaking a huge array of non-proliferation and
disarmament commitments.14
This stance, taken by the five nuclear powers (USA,
UK, France, Russia and China) and other major nuclear
suppliers, vis-à-vis, India, was not simply a matter of
policy-preference. Arguably, it was also dictated by
their existing legal commitments, under the NPT and
related documents. The NPT recognises only the five
powers as de jure nuclear weapons states (NWS). Its
Article 4 provides for the inalienable right of all other
states to develop only their peaceful nuclear pro-
grammes, and enjoins the NWS and states with
advanced civil nuclear capabilities to assist especially
developing non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) parties
to NPT to this end. While this does not automatically
exclude assistance to a non-NPT party like India, the
language of Article 415 suggests that any such venture
must be conditioned on the non-party state’s under-
taking extensive non-proliferation commitments.
NPT Article 3 and subsequent decisions at NPT review
conferences suggest that these commitments include the
recipient state’s acceptance of ‘comprehensive’ or ‘full-
scope’ ‘safeguards’, i.e. International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) inspections and verification on all
nuclear sites.16 While Article 3 distinguishes between
the obligations of recipient NNWS party to the NPT
and supplier states, requiring the former to accept safe-
guards on all nuclear sites, and the latter to ensure that
all materials and technology supplied by them is for use
at safeguarded sites (but not to ensure that all nuclear
sites of the recipient are safeguarded), the distinction
may have been eroded by subsequent interpretative
12. 729 UNTS 161 (1968).
13. 35 ILM 1439 (1996).
14. For accounts of such proposals See S. Talbott, Engaging India: Diploma-
cy, Democracy and the Bomb (2006); G. Perkovich, India’s Nuclear
Bomb, The Impact on Global Proliferation (1999).
15. In particular, its express reference to Arts. 1 and 2 which set out obliga-
tions of horizontal non-proliferation of NWS and NNWS.
16. The details of the comprehensive safeguards scheme are spelt out in
IAEA, ‘The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency
and States required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons’, INFCIRC/153 (corrected), reprinted, 1972.
<www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.
pdf>. Some states have also adopted an Additional Protocol which gives
the IAEA enhanced powers of inspection. For a crisp summary of the
system of safeguards and additional protocols, see D. Joyner, Interna-
tional Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(2009), at 19-23.
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practice.17 For example, the document ‘Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarma-
ment’ adopted by consensus by NPT parties at the 1995
NPT Review and Extension Conference provides, as
Principle 12:
New supply arrangements for the transfer of [nuclear
materials or technology] to non-nuclear-weapon
States should require, as a necessary precondition,
acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and inter-
nationally legally binding commitments not to
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.18
Moreover, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a net-
work of the principal suppliers of nuclear materials and
technology, has also adopted a requirement to condition
all transfers on recipient states’ acceptance of compre-
hensive IAEA safeguards.19 This requirement is stated
as a ‘guideline’ but is strictly observed by NSG mem-
bers, so that any state in perceived violation is asked to
explain its breach of its NSG commitments.20
The position taken in the abovementioned Principle 12
and the NSG guidelines is also consonant with the dis-
armament obligation stated in NPT Article 6. Article 6
provides for all states’ obligations
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and
on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control.
The scope of this obligation may seem ambigu-
ous – does it entail an obligation of conduct, to pursue
negotiations; or an obligation of result, to achieve dis-
armament – but the International Court of Justice has
clarified that it entails an obligation of result.21 Of
course, the result is far from being achieved, but the
17. As is provided for in Art. 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, (VCLT), 8 ILM 679 (1969). The provision states: Art. 31.
General Rule of Interpretation… 3. There shall be taken into account,
together with the context: (b) any subsequent practice in the applica-
tion of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regard-
ing its interpretation.
18. ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarma-
ment’, NPT Review and Extension Conference 1995, Decision 2, NPT/
CONF.1995/32 (Part I) Annex. <www.un. org/disarmament/WMD/
Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199501.pdf>. This argument is
advanced in, amongst other works, Christer Ahlström, ‘Legal aspects of
the Indian–US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative’, SIPRI Yearbook:
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (2006).
19. NSG, ‘Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers’, INFCIRC/254/Rev.10 Part I,
2011. In addition to these ‘Part I’ guidelines on transfers of nuclear
materials and technology, the NSG has also adopted a set of guidelines
dealing with transfers of dual-use (i.e. nuclear and non-nuclear) materi-
als and technology; these are set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev. 8 Part II,
2010.
20. See for instance the criticism of Russia for supplying nuclear fuel to
India: Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokeman, US Depart-
ment of State (February 16, 2001) at <www.fas.org/nuke/control/nsg/
news/treaty-nsg-010216.htm>.
21. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion),
(1996) ICJ Reports 226, 264-265, paras 101-103.
obligation, at the very least, should exclude measures by
NPT party states that encourage any state’s nuclear
weapons ambitions.
And yet, despite the restraints imposed by the existing
legal commitments of the United States (an NPT party
and an NSG member), here it was, announcing ‘full civ-
il nuclear cooperation’ with India. This, as fleshed out
in the bilateral agreement subsequently negotiated by
the two states,22 included transfer of nuclear materials
and technology from the USA to India, cooperation in
developing a strategic fuel reserve and other fuel supply
guarantees including, as needed, in collaboration with
the United Kingdom, France, Russia, rights to enrich
(up to 20%) and reprocess nuclear fuel, and to carry out
activities involving ‘controlled thermonuclear fusion’.
Several provisions of the agreement moreover, offered
pointed affirmation of India’s nuclear weapons pro-
gramme.23 This extended to omitting express reference
to the possibility and consequences of further nuclear
tests by India. Moreover, while Article 14 of the agree-
ment implied that such a nuclear test might be a basis
for cessation of cooperation, it also clarified that the var-
ious fuel supply guarantees stated in the agreement
would not be affected.
Of course, India was asked to take some actions in order
to ensure that the materials and technology supplied
under this agreement did not contribute directly to its
22. Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of India concerning Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy, August 3, 2007 (‘India-USA Agreement’). The
Agreement was concluded in March 2006 and ratified in October 2008;
the 2007 date is commonly used because it was at this time that the
terms of the agreement were made public.
23. Examples from the text of the bilateral agreement include: (i) In the pre-
amble: Wishing to develop such cooperation on the basis of mutual
respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,
equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and with due respect for each oth-
er’s nuclear programmes;… Affirming that cooperation under this
Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technol-
ogy, both Parties having the same benefits and advantages….
(ii) Art. 2. Scope of Cooperation… 4. The Parties affirm that the pur-
pose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation
and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party.
Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting
the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material,
non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technol-
ogy produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any
nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, infor-
mation or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement.
This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder
or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of
nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, infor-
mation or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired
or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own
purposes. (iii) Art. 12. Implementation of the Agreement. 1. This Agree-
ment shall be implemented in a manner designed: (a) to avoid hamper-
ing or delaying the nuclear activities in the territory of either Party; (b)
to avoid interference in such activities… (iv) Art. 13. Consultations 1.
The Parties undertake to consult at the request of either Party regarding
the implementation of this Agreement and the development of further
cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a stable,
reliable and predictable basis. The Parties recognise that such consulta-
tions are between two States with advanced nuclear technology, which
have agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices and
acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries
with advanced nuclear technology.
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nuclear weapons production. It was asked to draw up
and execute a plan to separate its military and civil
nuclear facilities and to put all of the latter type under
IAEA safeguards. This, while ensuring non-diversion of
the supplied materials, amounted to an exceptional con-
cession for India. For, the type of safeguards it was sub-
ject to was more akin to those applied to NWS rather
than NNWS in USA’s bilateral agreements.24 More-
over, this concession was also exceptional given the
United States’ own obligations under the NPT,
NSG guidelines, and its domestic legal framework for
international nuclear trade under section 123 of the 1954
Atomic Energy Act.25 And the United States obviously
recognised this from a fairly early stage. Its 2005 Joint
Statement with India spoke of the need to ‘work with
friends and allies to adjust international regimes’ as well
as the USA’s own domestic laws to enable this coopera-
tion. The bilateral agreement spoke more specifically of
the need to ‘work with friends and allies to adjust the
practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group’;26 avoiding
discussion of whether there would be need to ‘adjust’
also NPT provisions as modified by subsequent prac-
tice. The latter, naturally, would have been a much
more complex proposition.
The process undertaken by the United States and India
in persuading their friends and allies to condone the
necessary adjustments amounted to this: India prepared
a Separation Plan demarcating its civil and military
nuclear programmes. Then, together with the IAEA it
arrived at an ‘India Specific Safeguards Agreement’
(ISSA)27 applicable to its civil nuclear facilities, that was
approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. Finally, the
NSG issued a waiver permitting nuclear trade with
India, suspending its requirement for comprehensive
safeguards vis-à-vis India. The Deal was also approved
by the US Congress.
The process refined several features of the Deal, and
also multilateralised it, opening the gate for other states
too to enter into civil nuclear trade with India. It culmi-
nated in India and the United States’ ratification of the
bilateral agreement in October 2008. Nevertheless, the
conditions governing nuclear trade with India have con-
tinued to evolve, shaped by India’s conclusion of trade
agreements with other states; as well as by multi-lateral
decisions at the NSG, the 2010 NPT review conference,
and at G-20 meetings.
With that brief account, I turn now to the four presenta-
tions of the Deal’s passage through 2005-2008, in the
narratives of fragmentation, pluralism, constitutionalisa-
tion and global administrative law.
24. For a comparison of the India-US nuclear deal with bilateral agreements
concluded by the United States with China, Japan, United Arab Emi-
rates and Euratom, see Ranganathan, Visions of International Law, at
163-173.
25. PL 83-703.
26. Art. 5(6), India-USA Agreement.
27. Agreement between the Government of India and the International
Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian
Nuclear Facilities, INFCIRC/754, 2009.
3. The Deal as an Example of
Fragmentation
The Deal, quite obviously, may serve as an example of
the fragmentation of international law. For, the bilateral
agreement between India and the United States estab-
lishes a special framework that falls outside the purview
of the NPT-based regime, and possibly is contrary to
USA’s obligations under the regime.
The NPT provision (Art. 4) on nuclear assistance from
nuclear powers to developing states is often described as
one element of a ‘bargain’, under which all NPT parties
except the five NWS gave up their liberty to pursue
nuclear weapons programmes; in return, the NNWS
were to be assisted in developing their civil nuclear pro-
grammes and protected against threats of nuclear
attacks, and were promised that the NWS would also
gradually disarm.28 India, though a participant to the
drafting process, did not accept this bargain and refused
to sign the NPT; it remains one of three states that are
not, and have never been, NPT parties. Therefore, if
– given especially the numbers of its adherents – the
NPT bargain is understood to provide the global legal
framework for civil nuclear trade, India falls outside this
framework’s scope, but USA does not. The Deal then
sets up an alternative that partially intersects with the
existing framework, and uses the fact of India’s non-par-
ty status as a justification for the application of a differ-
ent set of standards, exemplified by the ISSA. This is,
simply, a fragmentation of the legal framework for
nuclear trade into differing general and specific
schemes.
But the narrative of fragmentation extends beyond the
creation of partially intersecting frameworks on the
same issue, to the attempt to disconnect and separately
address issues that are closely-related; here, the pursuit of
nuclear energy and the production of nuclear weapons.
The Deal was premised on the assumption that it was
possible, and appropriate, to distinguish India’s civil
and military nuclear programmes – these could be seg-
regated not just physically, by following a ‘Separation
Plan’; but also conceptually, so that providing nuclear
materials to India’s civil nuclear facilities could be justi-
fied as having no implications for the recognition or
development of its nuclear weapons programme. For
example, quite early on, the then Indian Foreign Secre-
tary, Shyam Saran, stated:
…the important thing to remember here is that the
July 18th joint statement is not about India’s strategic
program. It is an agreement about civil and nuclear
energy cooperation between India and the US…
whatever is coming as technology or cooperation
28. See Ranganathan, Visions of International Law, at 178 (2011); Joyner,
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, at 39-40.
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from its partners would not be diverted to India’s
strategic program…29
Similarly, then US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice’s address to the US Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations defined the issue as being primarily of India’s
quest for energy security, moreover a quest whose
urgency had led to unsuitable international alliances:
India’s a nation of over a billion people with an econ-
omy growing at approximately eight percent each
year. It has a massive and rapidly growing appetite
for energy. It is now the world’s sixth largest con-
sumer of energy. Diversifying India’s energy sector
will help it to meet its ever increasing needs and more
importantly, ease its reliance on hydrocarbons and
unstable sources like Iran. This is good for the Unit-
ed States.30
This attempt to define the Deal as focused on India’s
energy needs and disconnected from its nuclear weap-
ons programme overlooks several aspects. The first is
the lesson from history. It is widely accepted, including
by the United States, that India had conducted its first
nuclear test in 1974 by diverting to this purpose pluto-
nium produced by the Canada-supplied CIRUS nuclear
reactor; indeed the NSG was first established as a direct
consequence of this action.31 Second, the language of
the India-USA bilateral agreement, with all the referen-
ces to India’s advanced nuclear capabilities and the
USA’s lack of desire to interfere with these, clearly
shows that the disconnection between India’s civil and
military purposes was superficial; by implication at least
the Deal was an affirmation of India’s nuclear pro-
gramme. Moreover, as a prominent architect of India’s
nuclear policy pointed out, the Deal also offered a prac-
tical boost to this programme – again not directly, but
quite materially – by freeing up India’s indigenous
nuclear fuel resources, always in short supply, for weap-
ons production.32 Third, and most significantly, the
splintering of nuclear governance into separate catego-
ries of proliferation and energy cooperation is something
that the United States (and its ‘friends and allies’) have
consistently found themselves unable to do in case of
other states, notably Iran.
Iran is an NPT party, and had accepted comprehensive
safeguards way back in 1974. While it has maintained
29. S. Saran, ‘Transforming U.S.-India Relations: Forging a Strategic Part-
nership’, Address at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
21 December 2005.
30. C. Rice, Opening Remarks to the US Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 5 April 2006.
31. See NSG, ‘The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role and Activities’,
Background document, INFCIRC/539/Rev. 3 (30 May 2005). The
document states that the NSG was formed ‘following the explosion in
1974 of a nuclear device by a non-nuclear-weapon State, which dem-
onstrated that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes
could be misused.’ India, incidentally, has held to the position that this
was a ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion. For a detailed discussion, see Perko-
vich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, Chapter 7.
32. K. Subrahmanyam, ‘India and the Nuclear Deal’, Times of India,
12 December 2005.
several – later revealed – secret nuclear fuel enrichment
facilities, IAEA inspectors have not found these to pro-
duce weapons-grade fuel, and have not detected any
other evidence of a nuclear weapons programme.33 Even
so, in 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors voted to
report to the Security Council that IAEA was unable to
conclude that there were no undeclared nuclear mate-
rials or activities in Iran.34 The Security Council has
since repeatedly demanded that Iran suspend all enrich-
ment activity, and – rejecting Iran’s claim that it was
merely exercising its NPT right to develop nuclear
energy production – imposed sanctions. However the
situation resolves itself, its prominent feature has been
the unwillingness to accept Iran’s defence that its fuel
production has no link to nuclear weapons production.
Given that this is almost exactly opposite to the stance
taken towards India, Iran has obviously criticised the
Deal as reflecting the USA’s double standards.35
More than double standards however, the Deal reflects
the progression of a deformalised approach:36 what is rel-
evant is not the actions, but the actors; the standards
applied to interpret actions differ based upon who is
performing them. Thus, that which is possible for India,
is out of the question for Iran.37 This too was evident in
Rice’s justification:
It is simply not credible to compare India to North
Korea or to Iran. While Iran and North Korea are
violating their IAEA obligations, India is making new
obligations by bringing the IAEA into the Indian
program and seeking peaceful international coopera-
tion. Iran and especially North Korea are, of course,
closed non-democratic societies. India is a democra-
cy. In fact, India is increasingly doing its part to sup-
port the international community’s efforts to curb the
dangerous nuclear ambitions of Iran.38
Thus we see evidence of two further aspects of fragmen-
tation: cabining of related matters (non-proliferation
and nuclear energy that were intimately linked in the
NPT) into different categories, to be addressed by sepa-
rate sets of rules; and the use of non-formal criteria in
determining the standards to be applied to various
states.
The Deal can, however, be harnessed into the fragmen-
tation narrative to an even greater extent, serving as evi-
dence for what Benvenisti and Downs have called
33. See ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran’, Report by the IAEA Director General to the Board of
Governors, GOV/2006/15, 27 February 2006.
34. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/14, 4 February 2006.
35. S. Varadarajan, ‘As Pakistan hails “precedent,” other IAEA members
express doubts, fears,’ The Hindu, 2 August 2008.
36. Something we see also in the pluralism narrative.
37. See D.E. Sanger, ‘Reshaping Nuclear Rules’, New York Times, 15 March
2005.
38. Rice, supra n. 30.
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strategic fragmentation.39 They argue that powerful states
routinely use fragmentation as a deliberate strategy in
order to maintain their relative hegemony over the
international system. They do so in four ways. They
create narrowly focused bilateral agreements rather than
multilateral ones in order to reduce the opportunities
for coalition building amongst other states. They pur-
sue, where multilateral engagement cannot be avoided,
decision-making in one-time settings to ones calling for
more repeated interactions. They avoid establishing
bureaucratic or judicial fora. And, the shifting inter-
actions to congenial fora, including by withdrawing
from existing agreements and creating new ones where
necessary.40 In these ways, the states are able to shape
the international legal order to serve their interests. The
authors cite two important examples of the use of these
strategies. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) ori-
ginated from a decision by USA and the European
Union to withdraw from the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions and conclude a bilateral ‘modified’ version of the
1947 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, that
other states, including GATT 1947 members, were
‘invited’ to join – or risk losing access to US and EU
markets. In the 1980s, eight ‘western’ states created an
alternative sea-bed mining regime to that provided in
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, forcing ultimately the negotiation of the more
favourable – to them – 1994 Implementation Agree-
ment.41
The Deal, it is easy to see, serves a similar purpose. To
begin with it has an interesting back story.42 It has been
suggested that the impetus for it came from the United
Kingdom and France, who were keen to tap into India’s
nuclear energy market but felt inhibited by their NPT
commitments. They approached the United States to
pilot the modification of the existing legal framework.
The India-US nuclear deal was thus the product of the
three states’ desire to recalibrate the nuclear governance
regime to enable them to pursue their economic and
commercial interests.
The approach taken by the United States to achieve this
end was to focus on adjusting the NSG Guidelines;
nuclear trade with India was thus delinked from USA’s
NPT commitments. The NSG, while a multi-lateral
organisation operating on the consensus principle, is an
informal one and includes a higher concentration of
USA’s friends and allies than does the NPT, making it a
much easier matter to obtain a specific concession for
India. Consider what this meant for the NSG’s position
vis-à-vis the NPT. While in case of all other instances of
civil nuclear trade, the NSG supplied enhanced condi-
39. E. Benvenisti and G. Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Econ-
omy and the Fragmentation of International Law’, 60 Stanford Law
Review, at 595 (2007). See also N. Krisch, ‘International Law in Times
of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International
Legal Order’, (2005) 16 EJIL 369.
40. Benvenisti and Downs, supra n. 39, 599, 610 et seq.
41. Ibid., 615-616.
42. Narrated by an anonymous source from UK Foreign and Common-
wealth Office.
tions additional to those provided in the NPT; in case of
the India-US Deal, the NSG became a substitute for
the NPT; a waiver from its safeguards requirements
becoming the only relevant legal adjustment, to the
exclusion of conditions under the NPT. Thus we see a
crude substitution of a multilateral treaty by a more
limited, informal, forum.
In this final presentation, fragmentation moves from
being simply phenomenon to being a project, shared by
a few states, of maintaining hegemonic control over the
international system. As such, it immediately calls forth
various counter-narratives that challenge the descriptive
claim of the ends produced by strategic fragmentation,
and offer a normative vision for the international sys-
tem. The three other narratives addressed in this sym-
posium may each be considered such a counter narra-
tive.
4. Counter-Narratives of the
Deal: Pluralism,
Constitutionalism and Global
Administrative Law
4.1. Global Legal Pluralism
Let us start with global legal pluralism. This is, in some
ways, exactly the ‘other face’ of fragmentation; it is the
glass half-full to fragmentation’s glass half-empty. If
fragmentation describes the splintering of the interna-
tional legal system into multiple, intersecting, issue-
specific regimes, pluralism celebrates the decentralisa-
tion of power, away from a handful of treaties and
institutions dominated by the most powerful states.
An example of pluralism’s descriptive challenge to the
spectre raised by fragmentation can be seen in Laurence
Helfer’s work on regime shifting in the field of intellec-
tual property protection.43 Helfer describes the devel-
oped states-led ‘folding’ of intellectual property rights
protection into the WTO regime, in the form of the
1994 Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agree-
ment (‘TRIPS’) and the further additions TRIPS-plus
standards; but he also describe the challenges to TRIPS,
by developing states, NGOs and intergovernmental
organisations. These latter challenges have been mani-
fested in a series of efforts to shift intellectual property
law-making to more congenial fora within regimes on
biological diversity, public health, plant genetic resour-
ces and human rights. The resultant ‘existence of multi-
ple, discrete regimes, any one of which may plausibly
serve as a site for future policy development, leaves con-
siderable room for manoeuvring by different clusters of
states (or states and NGOs) seeking to maximise their
respective interests.’44
43. L. Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and the New Dynam-
ics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking’, 29 Yale Journal of International
Law 1 (2004).
44. Ibid., 8.
23
Surabhi Ranganathan ELR June 2013 | No. 1
This article from Eleven Journals was created for Erasmus Universiteit
Building on this, we may say that the normative case for
a pluralistic legal order rests on two bases: inclusion and
contestation. The proponents of pluralism claim that an
order characterised by a multiplicity of treaties and
treaty-based regimes offers greater opportunities for
representation of, and critical engagement between, dif-
ferent viewpoints. Writing on conflicts between treaty
regimes relating to global fisheries, Margaret Young, for
example, argues that we should engage with treaties, not
merely as legal instruments, but as vehicles for ideas. A
multiplicity of treaties, and the ensuing treaty conflict,
is an opportunity for obtaining a richer diversity of per-
spectives, and for mutual learning and coordination
between regimes.45 Nico Krisch elaborates upon the
greater accountability of actors that results from the
continuous process of criticism and review implied in
the contestations for authority in a pluralistic order.46
This process, he claims, will in most cases produce
‘pragmatic accommodation’ between the contesting
actors.47
These descriptive and normative theses on pluralism are
not advanced in an uncritical way. Even as Helfer relates
the possibilities of representation of different perspec-
tives in law-making and dispute settlement, bargaining
and cooperation, generated by the existence of multiple,
discrete regimes, he reminds us that regime shifting
‘may also spawn inefficient rivalries among actors or
attenuate mechanisms for holding international institu-
tions accountable to affected constituencies. And it
increases the likelihood of conflicting or incoherent legal
obligations for states and private parties….’48 Young
notes the risks of ‘managerialism’, of deformalisation,
inherent in adopting a coordinating approach in the
name of taking into account a broader range of perspec-
tives.49 And Krisch accepts that pluralism remains chal-
lenged by two ‘central difficulties’: the lack of certainty
caused by the process of continuous contestation
between actors all of whom lack the final authority to
pronounce upon an issue; and the more serious chal-
lenge that isolated counter-examples notwithstanding,
pluralism may exacerbate power disparities.50 The
defense of pluralism, then, is maintained on two
grounds: the absence of any other more plausible vision
– apart from the difficulties of its realisation, is not a
centralised legal order all the more likely to perpetuate
these power disparities? – and a call for the adoption of
substantive and procedural norms to frame the process
of pluralistic contestation, coordination and accommo-
dation. These may be principles of mutual recognition,
toleration, coherence, or inclusiveness of political com-
munication,51 or more broadly what Young describes as
45. M. Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish: The Interaction between Regimes
in International Law, at 275-276 (2011).
46. N. Krisch, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’, 17 EJIL, at 247
(2006).
47. Ibid., 268.
48. Helfer, supra n. 43, at 82.
49. Young, supra n. 45, at 276.
50. Krisch, supra n. 46, at 275-276.
51. Ibid., 276.
a principle of good governance ‘openness, transparency,
review and participation’.52
Let us consider whether the Deal may be narrated
through the perspective of global legal pluralism. The
short answer here is that it may be. Descriptively, the
Deal is an example of pluralism in nuclear governance.
It is a connected but separate framework that addresses
India’s specific circumstances: its non-NPT status,
nuclear weapons, need for energy security, etc. Further-
more, aspects of the Deal may be relied upon to back the
claims of inclusion and contestation that are attached to
pluralism. The Deal may be represented as a challenge
to an existing hegemony, maintained in an NPT-based
nuclear governance regime that divides the world into
nuclear-haves and have-nots and that – despite the rhet-
oric of disarmament – is complicit in the preservation of
the former’s nuclear weapons programmes. That the
NPT bolstered an established structure of power is no
revelation; the five de jure NWS are also the five perma-
nent members of the UN Security Council. We may
argue that Deal challenges this structure and provides
for a more inclusive approach in at least the following
ways:
First, India, which had resisted this classification of de
jure NWS and NNWS, and was, at the time of the
drafting of the NPT, a leader of the non-aligned move-
ment and of the call for a New International Economic
Order, had been cast into the role of a principal chal-
lenger to the NPT-supported hegemony; its 1974
‘peaceful nuclear test’, was popularly described as resist-
ance, and its later 1998 tests a manifestation of the fail-
ure of the five nuclear weapons states to work towards
disarmament.
Second, by updating the geopolitical vision underlying
the NPT. If we accept that it is appropriate for a non-
proliferation treaty to take into account the type of
concerns for which the NPT recognised some states’
nuclear weapons – at its drafting conference, the US
representative’s statement (hinting at the Cold War),
‘[w]e all know why it is not possible to include in this
treaty actual limitations on the nuclear arms of the
nuclear-weapons States’53, was sufficient to abort dis-
cussions on limiting nuclear weapons states from assist-
ing the weapons programmes of other nuclear weapons
states – the Deal amends the NPT’s dated and limited
outlook on which security concerns were important.
After all, the Cold War context, which was used to justi-
fy the United States’ assistance to the UK is long gone,
but the geopolitics that underlay the arms race between
India and Pakistan are still current.
Third, in favour of the act of disconnection, referred to
earlier, it may be argued that the NPT unfairly couples
states’ opportunities for economic development through
improved access to nuclear energy, with their adherence
to a discriminatory global order that locks in the strate-
52. Young, supra n. 45, at 301. These are of course principles also
embraced by GAL.
53. Statement of the US Representative, ENDC/PV. 369, 22 February 1968,
para. 51.
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gically superior status of some states. Whatever the
rationale for this coupling – and I earlier described it as
representing a ‘bargain’ – there is a disquieting ‘bite the
cartridge’54 flavour to its appearance in the NPT, which
calls to mind many other highly criticised instances in
which economic assistance has been tied to conditionali-
ties. The Deal may thus be defended as representing a
move to decouple strategic issues from nuclear energy
assistance. Indeed, there are groups, such as the Left
parties in India, which criticise it precisely for failing to
do so in full measure (their claim is that the Deal is a
means to align India’s foreign policy with the United
States’).55
The Deal may thus seem propagate ideas that differ
from, and challenge, those engrained in the NPT. Is
this, however, sufficient to justify the Deal on the plat-
form of global legal pluralism? Many questions immedi-
ately arise. Which views should be included in an ‘inclu-
sive’ regime? Can a challenge to an existing hegemonic
consensus be distinguished from the attempt to establish
a new consensus? Do the NPT’s efforts to limit the
spread of nuclear weapons, flawed as they may be,
deserve this type of challenge? Arguably, there is no
current conception of pluralism that sets out the appro-
priate scope of ‘inclusion’ or ‘contestation’, such that it
can guide us in answering such questions.
Let us examine other claims that form part of the case
for pluralism. These are that it offers opportunities for
mutual learning, and in most cases leads to a pragmatic
accommodation, and that fears of confusion and
entrenchment of power disparities can be met where
principles of ‘good governance’ are followed.
Again, the Deal bolsters these claims to some extent.
The United States and India both pointed to their fairly
pluralistic approach taken towards the operationalisation
of the Deal: the process included approval (of the ISSA)
by the IAEA Board of Governors which seats about
thirty IAEA member states; and the NSG, which has
forty-five members, all principal nuclear suppliers. As I
have detailed elsewhere,56 the involvement of the IAEA
and the NSG, led to its modification, from an act of
pure US and Indian exceptionalism, to one more firmly
tied to the principles and ends of nuclear non-prolifera-
tion. The ISSA in its final form did not quite match the
scope of the comprehensive safeguards agreements con-
cluded by non-nuclear weapons states party to the
NPT, but, it expanded India’s commitments beyond
those envisaged in the IAEA template for item-specific
safeguards by allowing the IAEA to inspect not only the
correctness but also the completeness of India’s declara-
54. The phrase goes back to the time of British colonisation of India; where
in May 1857, Indian sepoys in the British army had to use Enfield rifles;
this entailed having to bite cartridges greased with cow or pig fat (both
abhorrent to the sepoys for religious reasons). Those who refused to
bite the cartridges lost their jobs. This episode was one of the key trig-
gers for the 1857 Indian mutiny against the British.
55. Left Stand on the Nuclear Deal: Notes Exchanged in the UPA – Left
Committee on India–US Civil Nuclear Cooperation (2008), at 9-15.
56. S. Ranganathan, International Law and Strategically Created Treaty
Conflicts, Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge University, 31 January 2012, Chap-
ter 6.
tion of its peaceful nuclear activities. It also excluded the
exceptional feature, i.e. provisions for ‘corrective meas-
ures’ that India might take to restore nuclear supplies,
which had been mentioned in the 2007 bilateral agree-
ment (only the preamble made a brief reference to
them). Moreover it exterminated the possibility that
India might use the Deal as a platform for a claim to be
treated equivalent to de jure NWS – the ISSA is not in
the mould of the NWS’s voluntary offer arrangements
with the IAEA, though this is how India has initially
described the agreement it was seeking to conclude.57
All of this was further clarified during the process of the
IAEA Board of Governors’ consideration for approval of
the ISSA. Similarly, at the NSG, a particularly fraught
process saw the addition of several conditions to the
‘clean waiver’ that the USA had promised to obtain for
India; the NSG agreed to waive the requirement of
comprehensive safeguards for India on the basis of sev-
eral commitments, including that India would not con-
duct a nuclear test (a matter that had received no
express mention in the 2007 bilateral agreement).58
In addition to its accommodation to the NPT-based
nuclear regime in these ways, the Deal also provided the
impetus for a rejuvenation of the NPT’s non-prolifera-
tion and disarmament framework. Even though during
2005-2008, the Deal was given no mention at the NPT
Preparatory Conferences – the United States’ docu-
ments and statements at these conferences made not
even one reference to it, and NGO coalitions attempts
to generate discussion on it remained on the sidelines –
at the 2010 Review Conference the NPT ‘bargain’ was
reaffirmed. This included the firm statement that nu-
clear energy assistance must be premised on compre-
hensive safeguards, calls for India (and Pakistan and
Israel) to join the NPT, and a stronger statement on dis-
armament actions to be undertaken by NWS.59 As such
the 2010 conference was in marked contrast to the pre-
vious, 2005 Review Conference, which had demonstrat-
ed just how beleaguered the NPT had become.
Before I discuss the role of principles of good gover-
nance, and since this role will also be espoused in one
version of the constitutionalisation narrative, let me
briefly review how, in contrast to global legal pluralism,
the Deal may also be presented as an example of the
constitutionalisation of the nuclear governance regime.
4.2. Constitutionalisation
There is, of course, now much writing on the constitu-
tionalisation of international law, including both
descriptive claims that international law is constitution-
alising, and normative claims, that this is the pathway to
57. The Indian position is elaborately described in C. Rajamohan, Impossi-
ble Allies: Nuclear India, United States and Global Order (2006),
247-251.
58. NSG, Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India, 7 September
2008.
59. See Final Document, NPT Review Conference 2010, NPT/CONF.
2010/50 (Vol. I). Indian strategic-affairs analysts had predicted that the
Deal would trigger such discussions at the Review Conference. For
example, Interview with Dr M. Sethi, Centre for Air Power Studies, New
Delhi, 2 December 2009 (on file).
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a more just global order. However, as Jan Klabbers
notes, in all this writing, it is often not entirely clear
what actually is ‘constitutionalisation’:
Many international lawyers talk about constitutionali-
zation of international law but do not seem to step
down from abstract heights: many claim that interna-
tional law is going through a process of constitution-
alization, but few work out what this means – or
could mean.60
This is of course a reflection of the contested nature of
the concepts – of constitution, constitutionalism and
constitutionalisation – themselves. After all, even in
domestic contexts, it is only the formal declaration of a
document as such that indicates to us that it is a ‘consti-
tution’; and that with its adoption, the polity has been
‘constitutionalised’; thus we can say with some certainty
that India, which became independent on 15 August,
1947 became a constitutional republic on 26 January,
1950, for its constitution was formally adopted on this
day. What happens where no such single document
exists, or declaration is made? For instance, what pre-
cisely is Britain’s constitution, and when did Britain
become constitutionalised? Most importantly, how do
we evaluate when precisely a document, or set of docu-
ments, has a sufficiently ‘constitutional’ character.
There are no fixed criteria for this; features that are con-
sidered elemental or the basic structure of one constitu-
tion, may find no mention at all in another. Daniel Hal-
berstam, for example, shows that it would be wrong to
imagine constitutional systems as either ‘closed’, i.e.
ignoring claims to legality from outside the system, or
‘fully-organised hierarchies’; this is not even true of the
United States constitution, which is ‘open’ to legality
claims based on international law, and fails to identify
any one organ of government as having the final power
to interpret the constitution.61 Specific features such as
separation of powers, judicial review, protection of fun-
damental human rights, and so on appear to greater or
lesser extents in different constitutions.
This naturally makes it harder (or much easier, depend-
ing on the way you look at it) to detect constitutionalisa-
tion at the international level. There have been sugges-
tions that the international community as a whole has a
constitution in the form of the UN Charter (and the
UN is thus a form of ‘world government’),62 or that spe-
cific regimes, like the European Union or the WTO, are
constitutional,63 or at least constitutionalising orders.
What makes them so? The EU and WTO have several
60. J. Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’, in J Klabbers et al., The Constitutionali-
zation of International Law (2009), at 3-4.
61. D. Halberstam, ‘Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Consti-
tutional Law: National, Supranational and Global Governance’, Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 229, November 2011.
62. B. Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the
International Community (2009).
63. See the references in J. Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’, 1 Internation-
al Organizations Law Review (2004), at 31, 33-34; Halberstam, Sys-
tems Pluralism and International Pluralism in Constitutional Law.
organs or institutions with defined powers and func-
tions, some provision for judicial settlement of disputes,
and the tendency to filter all other rules and standards
through the prism of their own purposes and principles.
Are these then, the indicia we should seek to identify in
other regimes to determine if they too are constitution-
alising?
Anne Peters offers the following as elements of constitu-
tionalisation: the gradual replacement of ‘sovereignty’
with ‘humanity’ as the foundational principle, the at
least partial replacement of state consent by majoritarian
decision-making, agreement on values such as human
rights protection, climate change, ‘maybe even free
trade’, and legalised and juridified processes of dispute
settlement.64 She recognises that it may be possible to
study each element and its role in global governance on
its own merits, without aiming to link it to some concept
of constitutionalism, but argues that it is the combina-
tion of these features that takes on the special normative
significance we associate with constitutionalism.65 In his
recent book, Nico Krisch offers to clear up matters fur-
ther by describing the three main positions in the global
constitutional debate.66 The first focuses on values act-
ing as checks on global politics, both because of their
own more entrenched acceptability, and because of the
crystallisation of institutional mechanisms that reinforce
them. The second is a structural approach that focuses
on the global order as a whole and views in it, or seeks to
achieve, a structure that ‘not only defines common val-
ues and processes but also the place of other institu-
tions, namely the state, in the global order’.67 The third
is a discursive strand that emphasises constitutional
pluralism, dialogue and (transparent, accountable,
inclusive) process as a means to advancement in a never-
ending quest towards universality.
In several ways, the India-USA Deal fits into all these
positions within the constitutional narrative. To begin
with, consider the Indian Foreign Secretary’s response
to the observation that the Deal was contrary to the
NPT:
[i]f we go by NPT concepts and objectives rather
than this littler text, then it is difficult to make a case
against the July 18 agreement. Bringing India into the
fold is not only a gain for international nonprolifera-
tion efforts, but indispensable for the emergence of a
new global consensus on nonproliferation in response
to current challenges.68
64. A. Peters, ‘The Merits of Global Constitutionalism’, 16 Indiana Journal
of Global Legal Studies 2, at 397, 398-400 (2009). To be clear, Peters
claims these features are additional to those already discussed in the
symposium of which this article forms part; but her reference to those
other features, such as a constitutional process for solving value con-
flicts, ‘balancing’ as a constitutional principle, the constitutional function
of responsibility may instead be read as the more specific examples of
her four more general features.
65. Ibid., 403.
66. N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postna-
tional Law (2011), at 32-35.
67. Ibid., 34.
68. Saran, supra n. 29.
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This argument, that the Deal represented an opportuni-
ty for the consolidation of the nuclear governance
regime, around values of non-proliferation and security,
was a core element also in the US government and
IAEA Director General’s defence of the Deal. The lat-
ter, Mohammed ElBaradei, claimed the Deal should be
welcomed because ‘[i]t would be a milestone, timely for
ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation
regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nu-
clear safety.’69 His position was received with much
consternation by scholars and advocates of non-prolifer-
ation, twelve of whom penned an open letter to him
arguing:
… you have consistently argued for universal
approaches to addressing the dangers posed by nu-
clear weapons and against perpetuating double stand-
ards governing nuclear weapon haves and have nots.
Creating far-reaching exemptions to international
rules for India betrays these two principles…70
But, of course, the claim advanced on the basis of the
constitutionalist narrative is that we should not view the
Deal as perpetuating double standards; instead by tying
the pursuit of nuclear energy to deeper values, such as
security and non-proliferation, the Deal achieves sub-
stantive, and not merely formal equality. Indeed, the US
Secretary of State’s speech to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, as excerpted earlier,71 viewed the
Deal as an opportunity to crystallise the link between
the right to nuclear energy and another core val-
ue – democracy. This was after all, the basis on which
she justified treating India differently from Iran or
North Korea.
The constitutional narrative privileges a non-formal,
substance-oriented approach to determining the rela-
tionship between rules.72 Values, not the black letter of
other rules, act as checks; therefore to the extent that we
can accept the justifications proffered by India, USA
and the IAEA in favour of the Deal as being in tune
with, and giving a boost to, specific and commonly held
values, we can reasonably argue that it does reflect that
the constitutionalisation of the nuclear governance
regime is underway. Indeed in this sense it also supports
an evolutionary interpretation of the NPT: no longer a
‘bargain’, but a constitutional instrument whose provi-
sions must be interpreted in terms of whether and how
they advance constitutional values of security and
democracy. The flipside of the approach – its relativisa-
tion of rights to values – is apparent. Moreover, the
approach elevates certain values above all others; it is
unsurprising that in many cases, the values invoked,
while described as commonly held, may be those best
suited to the interests of the powerful actors. Their ele-
69. ‘IAEA Director General Welcomes US and India Nuclear Deal’, Press
Release 2006/05, 2 March.
70. D. Kimball et al., ‘An Open Letter to Mohammed ElBaradei from twelve
nuclear experts’, 24 July 2006.
71. Supra note 33 and the accompanying text.
72. Peters, supra n. 64, at 406.
vation above rights and other values may simply legiti-
mate the hegemony of those powerful actors.
The Deal also fits into the structural strand of the con-
stitutional narrative. While, as Krisch notes, this strand
tends to be less pronounced because of the near impossi-
bility of its application to the global order as a whole, it
may be argued that the Deal does serve to crystallise the
place of various institutions as well as values. For
instance, we might claim that it clarifies the role of the
IAEA as the lynchpin of ‘a’ ‘nuclear governance
regime’. After all, the Deal was principally conditioned
on India’s conclusion of a suitable safeguards agreement
with the IAEA; and it was the IAEA Director General’s
assessment73 that the Agency had concluded an appro-
priate safeguards agreement that satisfied all the Agen-
cy’s legal requirements, promoted all the relevant
values, and offered the IAEA sufficient scope to inspect
and verify India’s peaceful nuclear facilities that provi-
ded impetus for other states’ approval of the Deal. The
IAEA’s role here went beyond inspection and verifica-
tion; it adopted the stance of an organ of the nuclear
governance regime, and in doing so provided opportuni-
ty for this crystallisation of the NPT, the Deal, the
NSG, etc., into such a regime. The Deal also provides
impetus for aggregating the various institutions, fora
and agreements relating to non-proliferation and nu-
clear trade into a multi-layered regime in a broader way:
the IAEA as the lynchpin, the NSG as the executive
arm of the NPT, and so forth. But these two bodies may
also be seen as making outward linkages, with other
regimes dealing with matters of global security (espe-
cially terrorism), development (for which energy pro-
duction is key) and democracy, by reviewing the Deal
according to these values. It is, of course, open to ques-
tion whether this sort of constitutionalism advances
‘global justice’ in any way, or whether it unfairly exalts a
commercial agreement destined to advance vested busi-
ness interests in USA and India.74
It may be that the normative defence for constitutional-
ism is best aligned to the third ‘discursive’ position. The
Deal and the process of its operationalisation certainly
offered several opportunities for deliberation over the
principles of the nuclear governance regime, and more-
over of the criteria that India would have to abide by in
order to persuade other states to set aside the usual rules
for its particular case. After all neither at the IAEA, nor
at the NSG was there a suggestion that it sufficed for
the Deal to satisfy prudential ends. As noted above in
the reference to the IAEA Director General’s speech, it
was also reviewed for whether it was ‘lawful’ in a broad
sense; and much thought was given to the appropriate
course of action that would equally make sense of
73. Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director-
General Dr. M ElBaradei, Vienna, 1 August 2008; see also S. Varadara-
jan, ‘As Pakistan hails “precedent,” other IAEA members express
doubts, fears’, 2 August 2008.
74. S. Ghoshroy, ‘The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal: Triumph of the Business
Lobby’, The Audit of Conventional Wisdom, MIT Center for Interna-
tional Studies, September 2006. <http://mit.edu/cis/pdf/
Audit_09_14_Ghoshroy.pdf>.
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India’s distinctive position in the nuclear governance
regime and the integrity of the regime itself. It could be
said, in short, that attention was given to accommodat-
ing difference in the quest for universality (which was
given no fixed – and therefore limited – meaning such
as of universal ratification of the NPT), and this was in
the course of deliberative processes through which both
the IAEA Board of Governors and the NSG members
(by consensus) were persuaded to give assent to the
Deal. There do remain questions both about the out-
come reached, and how to evaluate this discursive pro-
cess. Was it deliberative enough? Transparent enough?
Inclusive enough? What standards do we have to judge
these things? How do we ensure that a ‘discursive pro-
cess’ is not in fact one in which a few actors preach to
the rest? To explore these issues further, let me turn,
finally, to the fourth narrative: global administrative
law.
4.3. Global Administrative Law
The GAL project was inaugurated with the claim that
‘[e]merging patterns of global governance are being
shaped by a little-noticed but important and growing
body of global administrative law.’75 The descriptive
claim of the project is that ‘much of global governance
can be understood and analysed as administrative action:
rulemaking, administrative adjudication between com-
peting interests, and other forms of regulatory decision
and management.’76 And this action is to some extent
constrained by ‘mechanisms, principles, practices and
supporting social understandings that promote or other-
wise affect the accountability of global administrative
bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate
standards of transparency, participation, reasoned deci-
sion and legality and by providing effective review of the
rules and decisions they make.’77 These global adminis-
trative bodies may be of various types: formal treaty
bodies and international institutions; domestic adminis-
trative bodies performing functions that have transna-
tional implications; informal and even private bodies
that have assumed a regulatory role.
The claim of the GAL authors is not that there is
already convergence upon the principles and practices
that we may term global administrative law, or even that
we see the same sorts of accountability-enhancing mech-
anisms already applied in all areas and fields of global
governance. Rather it is that there are several emerging
common currents in both respects, and these need to be
recognised and analysed. The call of the project is two-
fold. One, for scholars to study, analyse, compare and
evaluate these developments, and in this way provide a
more comprehensive account of the ‘emergence of glob-
al administrative law’. Two, to bolster its advance by
reflecting on the possible sources for global administra-
tive law principles, the design of appropriate accounta-
bility mechanisms, and factors that contribute to the
75. B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, R. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Adminis-
trative Law’, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems, at 15 (2005).
76. Ibid., 17.
77. Ibid.
spread of these principles and mechanisms amongst
global administrative bodies. This is of course based on
the normative claim that more accountability is better.
GAL does not ignore the questions that immediately
arise. Accountability to whom? Might focusing on
improvements of procedure impede, the substantial
transformations – social and economic redistributions –
required for a more just world (because the appearance
of following appropriate administrative procedures may
legitimise institutions and laws that are substantively
unjust)?78 However, proponents of GAL argue that
casting global governance in administrative terms
‘might also create a platform for critique.’79 They point
out that ‘framing global regulation in traditional terms
of administration and regulation exposes its character
and extent more clearly than the use of vague terms
such as governance’.80 Thus, even if GAL is unable to
respond to thorny issues relating to democracy and sub-
stantive redistribution, it might yet ‘take pragmatic
steps towards a stronger inclusion of affected social and
economic interests through mechanisms of participation
and review open to NGOs, business firms, and other
civil society actors, as well as states and international
organisations.’81 At the very least, it might serve in ‘con-
trolling the periphery to ensure the integral functioning
of a regime, protecting rights, and building meaningful
and effective measures of accountability to control abu-
ses of power and secure rule-of-law values.’82 While its
critics are not convinced that GAL can be anything
more than ‘a very limited tool of resistance and change’83
and this too under certain conditions,84 they do recog-
nise the advantages to re-describing global governance
as administration. Koskenniemi, for instance, notes:
I totally approve of the political move to re-define the
managerial world of international institutions
through constitutional or administrative vocabularies
… for the critical challenge they pose to today’s cul-
ture of a-political expert rule, and perhaps for the
appeal of the (Kantian) perfectibility that they set up
as a regulative goal for human institutions.85
Let us then examine whether the Deal can be situated in
the GAL narrative, and whether that narrative advances
our understanding and critique of the event. The short
answer, again, is: yes, both, to some extent.
The Deal and the process of its operationalisation can be
analysed as a series of decisions made in the ‘global admin-
istrative space’, i.e. somewhere below the level of formal
78. For example B.S. Chimni, ‘Co-option and Resistance, Two Faces of
Global Administrative Law’, 37 NYU Journal of International Law and
Politics, at 799, 2005; Marks, ‘Naming Global Administrative Law’. See
also supra notes 5-7, and the accompanying text.
79. Kingsbury et al., supra n. 75, at 27.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., 50.
82. Ibid.
83. Chimni, supra n. 78, at 826.
84. Ibid., 827.
85. M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later’, 20
EJIL 7, at 17 (2009).
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inter-state agreement (though there was that too in the
form of the India-USA bilateral agreement), but with
implications across the boundaries of several states.
These decisions include the understandings arrived at
between the USA and India as to the steps necessary to
win some degree of multilateral acceptance for the Deal,
and those taken at the IAEA, the NSG and fora such as
the 2009 G8 Summit in L’Aquila (where the G8 states
decided not to supply enrichment and reprocessing
technologies to states like India that were not parties to
the NPT).86
These various fora stressed upon the importance of cri-
teria such as mutual openness, legality, participation,
reason-giving and transparency; and can themselves also
be examined on these bases. For example, in the discus-
sion on the steps that India and USA needed to take to
obtain multilateral acceptance for the Deal, US negotia-
tors laid great emphasis on the credibility, transparency
and defensibility of India’s plan for separating its milita-
ry and civil nuclear programmes.87 The NSG stressed
upon regular consultations between members and with
India for implementation of the waiver.88 The IAEA
focused on the lawfulness of the safeguards agreement it
concluded with India. As discussed above, the IAEA
Director General was at pains to explain how various
aspects of the ISSA were determined by international
law.89
More importantly, the process of decision-making,
much emphasised by the United States, India and their
allies, as consultative, transparent and accountable, may
be examined in terms of the criteria associated with
GAL. Let me focus here on the IAEA and the NSG.
At the IAEA, the ISSA was concluded by negotiation
between the IAEA Secretariat and India and then pre-
sented for approval to the IAEA Board of Governors
(BoG). The IAEA BoG comprises thirty-five states,
elected annually by the IAEA General Conference. At
the relevant meeting, it included a diverse group of
states that included Asian nuclear powers Pakistan and
China; two states most opposed to the Deal, Austria and
Ireland; and Brazil and Argentina, states that, scholars
had earlier claimed, were unhappy with concessions
offered to India while they were expected to faithfully
comply with intrusive safeguards regimes.90 Thus its
process may be seen as fairly inclusive. However, such
an evaluation would still have to take into account that
the criteria for BoG membership virtually guarantee
permanent membership for NWS and for several west-
ern states.91 Moreover, a two-thirds majority voting rule
86. G8, ‘Statement on Non-proliferation’, para. 8, G8 Summit, L’Aquila,
8 July 2009, <www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/2._LAqui-
la_Statent_on_Non_proliferation. pdf>.
87. See Rajamohan, supra n. 57, 231.
88. NSG Waiver, paras 3(e), 4 and 5.
89. IAEA Director General, Introductory Statement to the Board of Govern-
ors; Varadarajan, As Pakistan Hails Precedent; for a detailed discussion
see Ranganathan, Thesis, Chapter 6.
90. H. Sokolski, ‘Towards an NPT-restrained world that makes economic
sense’, 83 International Affairs 3, at 531, 543 (2007).
91. Art. VI(A), Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 276
UNTS 3 (1956).
coupled with BoG’s treatment of Iran suggests that the
IAEA BoG’s decision-making often lacks independence
from Western foreign policy interests.
The BoG’s approval of the ISSA was by consensus and
followed a defence of its text by the director General
and a discussion amongst the BoG members. In this
process, the ISSA was reviewed for its effectiveness,
legality and political acceptability.
While these are all positives, we should also keep in
mind that the agenda of the IAEA Secretariat and Board
was the more limited one of approving a safeguards
agreement, not the Deal and all that it implied for
India’s nuclear programmes and/ or the NPT regime.
Though the Deal may have provided the context, it
received little mention in the course of their activi-
ties – and no mention at all in the Director-General’s
remarks to the Board. It is possible that the limited
nature of the task led to a lower and more technical
scrutiny; indeed it has been reported that several Board
members, while expressing criticism, decided to reserve
their opposition to the Deal itself for the NSG session.92
The NSG is an informal group of forty-five states that
are the principal suppliers of nuclear materials and tech-
nology. It includes all five NWS, several European
states, and middle-powers like Canada, Australia, Brazil,
Argentina, Japan, South Korea and South Africa but
none of the nuclear ‘headaches’ – India, Pakistan, Iran,
North Korea or Israel. The European Commission and
the Chairman of the Zangger Committee (another
nuclear suppliers group, but more squarely tied to the
NPT) participate as observers.
Though it does include most principal suppliers, the
NSG is an exclusive club, and moreover one with opa-
que procedures – NSG deliberations happen behind
closed doors and it is not clear that they follow a fixed
format; though its participants have stressed that the
NSG does take steps to improve both participation and
transparency in its functioning.93 In any event, despite
its limitations, the NSG does have certain benefits: its
process may not be fixed, but it is consultative and its
decisions are made by consensus. This enables – in
theory at least – effective participation of all states and
indicates significant multi-lateral support for decisions
made.
This is indeed illustrated by the Deal: while there were
reports of USA and India’s massive leveraging of politi-
cal influence to secure the NSG waiver, the text finally
adopted was quite different from the draft by the USA
as early as in 2006,94 and also from the first draft circu-
lated in August 2008. Indeed, the meeting arranged for
21-23 August 2008 could not produce an outcome
because there were deep disagreements between states
92. R. Ramachandran, ‘Inching Closer’, 25 Frontline 17, 16-29 August
(2008).
93. Report by the Representative of Italy, Ambassador Guiseppe Balboni
Acqua on NSG Transparency, 2000 NPT Review Conference, Main
Committee III, New York 27 April. <www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/
Leng/PDF/NPT_2000_Report_by_NSG_1.pdf>.
94. NSG Draft 2006. <www.armscontrolwonk.com/1009/us-nsg-india-pro-
posal>.
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as to the scope of the waiver to be granted to India.
Reportedly New Zealand, Ireland, Austria, and the
Netherlands had introduced nearly fifty amendments to
the three-page draft circulated by the United States.95
After the failure of this round, a follow-up meeting was
scheduled from 5-7 September 2008. In the interim, the
United States worked with India and other states to
reframe some of these proposed conditions in terms that
were mutually acceptable to all; leading to the inclusion
of many key elements of the final text.96 However, even
with a modified draft it took two intensive days of nego-
tiations at the September meeting to secure the
waiver.97 Finally, consensus was achieved also on the
basis of a side-agreement between NSG members, not
to ‘sell sensitive technologies to India in the “foreseeable
future”’.98 The outcome document (the waiver) then
proceeded to set out reasons for, and conditions govern-
ing, the exception made for India. All of this provides
some sense of the deliberative – almost ‘tiresomely
deliberative’99 – nature of the NSG’s process.
The GAL criteria enable us to engage with institutional
activity in a meaningful way: we may discuss whether
and to whom these institutions are accountable and
comment on participation, deliberation, transparency,
review etc. entailed in their procedures. But they pro-
vide no ready answers as to the merits of the decisions
made by the institutions, or the choice made to route the
Deal through these institutions only (and not, say, an
NPT Conference of Parties). This limitation is built
into the choice of the GAL narrative.
95. See S. Varadarajan, ‘NSG critics focus on non-proliferation benchmarks’,
The Hindu, 22 August 2008; S. Varadarajan, ‘Conditions mooted for
Indian nuclear waiver’, The Hindu, 23 August 2008; S. Varadarajan,
‘India, US agree on amended NSG draft waiver’, The Hindu, 31 August
2008; P.D. Samanta, ‘To US draft, NSG sceptics want to add fine print’,
Indian Express, 21 August 2008.
96. S. Varadarajan, ‘India, US agree on amended NSG draft waiver’, The
Hindu, 31 August 2008; P.D. Samanta, ‘India agrees to more tweaks in
NSG draft’, Indian Express, 2 September 2008.
97. For an account of the NSG deliberations during the September meeting,
see: S. Varadarajan, ‘As NSG members mull new US draft, fate of India
deal hangs in balance’, The Hindu, 3 September 2008; S. Varadarajan,
‘New NSG draft has small but significant changes’, The Hindu, 5 Sep-
tember 2008; S. Varadarajan, ‘NSG hopeful of consensus soon’, The
Hindu, 5 September 2008; S. Varadarajan, ‘As NSG members take
‘political’ call, differences narrow’, The Hindu, 5 September 2008;
S. Varadarajan, ‘Individual governments should decide’, The Hindu,
5 September 2008; S. Varadarajan, ‘Nuclear deal staring at NSG dead-
end’, The Hindu, 6 September 2008; S. Varadarajan, ‘Last-ditch talks on
to avert NSG dead-end’, The Hindu, 6 September 2008; V. Kumar,
‘“India will not be a source of proliferation”, says Pranab’, The Hindu,
6 September 2008; S. Varadarajan, ‘NSG lifts sanctions on India’, The
Hindu, 7 September 2008; S. Varadarajan, ‘Waiver enables member
states to provide India full civil nuclear cooperation’, The Hindu, 7 Sep-
tember 2008. See also P.D. Samanta, ‘Beijing says why the hurry as
Vienna moves closer to a deal’, Indian Express, 4 September 2008.
98. ‘NSG agreed not to sell sensitive technologies to India’, The Hindu,
12 September 2008; ‘NSG not to sell sensitive technologies to India’,
Indian Express, 11 September 2008.
99. In the assessment of Dr. S. Varadarajan, Editor of The Hindu, and
award-winning journalist who had personally ‘covered’ the entire pas-
sage of the India-US Nuclear Deal. Personal Interview, 9 December
2009, on file with the author.
5. The Point of These
Narratives
The brief review above shows that descriptively, each
narrative provides a plausible account of the Deal vis-à-
vis the international legal order. Different elements of
the Deal or the process of its finalisation, as well as dif-
ferent interpretations of the same elements of both, can
be taken as evidence in support of arguments that the
international legal order is indeed fragmenting, or con-
stitutionalising or moving towards pluralism, or admin-
istrative rule by international institutions. Moreover
each narrative helps us make sense of some of the deci-
sions taken by the various actors involved in the Deal’s
process, against a broader contextual background. Thus,
descriptively, each goes some way in illuminating the
Deal. But of course, none suggests itself as the natural
or necessary narrative. The light cast on the Deal by
each may be challenged or complicated by the perspec-
tives afforded by the others. The review indeed reveals
that versions of all these narratives were leveraged by
various actors in support of particular outcomes, or pro-
cesses to be followed in concluding, finalising and justi-
fying the Deal.
It is worth reflecting on why these four narratives seem
to draw our attention more than perhaps any others (and
are indeed the narratives selected for this issue of ELR).
My suggestion is that while the four are in many ways
dissimilar, they are all easily received because individu-
ally and collectively, they conceive the possibility of a
political and legitimate international legal order. This
sets them apart from critical, realist, and doctrinal nar-
ratives of international law.
Critical narratives focus our attention on the ways that
international law is political and illegitimate. These crit-
ical narratives reveal to us the embedded structural bia-
ses of international institutions, which serve the repro-
duction and exacerbation of existing disparities.100 They
expose the imperial foundations of international law, its
continuing complicity in neo-imperial projects;101 and
the exclusions, of ideas, subjects, and perspectives, that
are embedded in it.102 Most biting are narratives that
suggest that inevitably, the legal form is allied to the
production of disadvantage.103 On the contrary, the nar-
ratives under consideration either see the international
law that exists as legitimate – only challenged by frag-
mentation; or undergoing transformations that will
enhance its legitimacy. None seeks a radical reconstruc-
tion of international law, but at the most the addition of
a few elements (such as ‘values’ or ‘hierarchy’) to its
conception. Equally, none considers that the founda-
100. M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of Internation-
al Legal Argument (2005), Epilogue.
101. A. Anghie, Imperialism, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of
International Law (2005).
102. H. Charlesworth and C. Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law:
A Feminist Analysis (2000).
103. C. Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International
Law (2005).
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tions of international law may be too rotten to support
any legitimate conception of the international legal
order.
Thus these narratives offer bases for faith in the possi-
bility of legitimate international law and legal order. But
there is more to them than that: it is not possible to dis-
miss them in the terms that ‘realist’ or ‘rational choice’
narratives use to describe international law scholarship:
‘an improbable combination of doctrinalism and ideal-
ism’, which ‘has made little progress in explaining how
international law works in practice: how it originates
and changes; how it affects behaviour among very dif-
ferent endowed states; when and why states act consis-
tently with it; and why it plays such an important role in
the rhetoric of international relations.’104 Rational choice
scholars claim that they, on the other hand, do answer
these questions ‘by integrating the study of international
law with the realities of international politics.’105
But these four narratives also recognise the politics of
international law. Accounts of fragmentation, constitu-
tionalisation, pluralism, or global administrative law are
first of all thick – if partial and subjective – descriptions
of the ways in which different actors: states, institutions
and others interact, illuminating the ways in which
international law originates, changes, develops, is
invoked, or challenged. Moreover, they score over
rational choice accounts by not positing any single
explanation, such as state interest, for what drives these
interactions. Indeed, positing explanations for why
international law works is not their primary aim; the
four narratives also score over rational choice narratives
by offering normative visions for the directions in which
international legal order should develop. As opposed to
merely viewing international law as ‘epiphenomenal’ to
politics, the narratives embrace the role of politics in
international law more squarely by advancing their own
distinctly political visions of international law. One sort
of vision is procedural: the legitimacy of international
law is linked to criteria of transparency, participation,
deliberation, reason-giving, accountability in decision-
making etc., and thus all state and institutional activity
is evaluated according to these criteria. The other vision
is more substantive: narratives, such as constitutional-
ism, and certain forms of pluralism and even global
administrative law, connect the legitimacy of interna-
tional law to the promotion of values. We might disa-
gree with the specific values taken up by the various
proponents of these projects (why ‘free trade’ and not
‘substantive economic justice’ for instance) but the call
for fresh engagement on the values that the international
legal order should promote, that is generated through
these narratives of international law, is understandably
welcome.
The narratives then offer basis for a rich debate on
international law – on what it is, how it is changing, and
the direction in which it should develop; without ever
104. J. Goldsmith and E. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005),
at 3.
105. Ibid.
straying from the belief it is worthy of our respect and
support. It is undeniable that they do avoid, even
exclude by their own logic, some uncomfortable ques-
tions. But, compare the debate they spawn with one in
which the poles are simply that ‘international law is epi-
phenomenal to state interests’ and that ‘it is rules, or
decisions of international courts’ – a sort of ‘yes it is/ no
it isn’t’ debate on the normative weakness of interna-
tional law. Those sorts of positions fail to appreciate the
relative autonomy of international law itself, how its
foundational principles, practices, processes, value
predilections etc. structure interactions. These four nar-
ratives by contrast offer entire visions built around these
features of international law, and so together, serve as
the sometimes contradictory, sometimes parasitical,
often shifting, but ultimately the few plausible accounts
of the possibility of international legal order. They thus
operate, and are valuable as, contesting starting points
from which to describe, and prescribe for, its reform
and development.
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